UVU Administration Response
This page tracks documented administrative actions at Utah Valley University on and after September 10, 2025 — drawn from GRAMA releases, official @UVU posts, and uvu.edu statements. It does not attribute motives or wrongdoing to named officials.
UVU's 158-page After-Action Report never once mentions the house UVU owns on the hill above the construction site, 691 W 925 S, even though the rooftop man's exit path ran right beside it and the rifle was found at the base of that hill. Who was in that house on September 10, and whose vehicles were parked in front, may be the single fastest way to crack open who really carried out Charlie Kirk's assassination. UVU holds the keys, the approvals, and the records, so we all need to ask UVU to release a "UVU House / Charlie Kirk Report".
Pre-Event Cabinet Communications (September 9)
GRAMA document UVU 25-330:0023 shows a UVU staff member escalated a 10:35 PM report — two visitors asking to speak with police about "a plan" — to the university cabinet (president's office chain). A follow-up at 11:19 PM reportedly dismissed the visitors as "GOP reps who played like they knew more than they did."
According to @danksterintel's review of 112 released pages:
- No one in the chain asked what "the plan" was
- No follow-up documented what the men told police
- Identities remain redacted
A separate 2:23 PM email (documents 0079/0080) sought to relay a message to Charlie Kirk through Chief Jeff Long's chain; delivery is not documented in the release. See Pre-Shooting Warnings.
GRAMA vs. @UVU official posts (cross-check)
@danksterintel's review of the 112-page Daily Caller GRAMA release is the backbone for administrative facts on this page. Cross-checked against official @UVU posts compiled on UVU Social Media Response:
| Topic | GRAMA / danksterintel record | @UVU public line |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-event warnings | Sept 9 "plan" escalated to cabinet; 11:19 PM dismissal as "GOP reps" | No contemporaneous public warning |
| First custody language | False "suspect in custody" ~19 min post-shot | Initial post cites shooting + custody framing |
| Location alert | "Shooter in [INSERT location]" ~88 min post-shot | Shelter-in-place without corrected location text in compiled posts |
| Post-event site | Courtyard paved ~Sept 14 per contractor account | No public engineering/preservation rationale located |
| Records | Additional GRAMA beyond 112 pages acknowledged but withheld | Grief/counseling messaging on uvu.edu |
Discrepancies are documented messaging gaps, not proof any official acted with criminal intent.
Day-of-Event Actions (September 10)
Campus Operations
Official @UVU posts (compiled here) report:
| Action | Source |
|---|---|
| Shooting during visiting-speaker event; initial custody language | @UVU |
| Campus closed, classes canceled, shelter-in-place | @UVU |
| FBI tip line shared | @UVU |
Emergency Alert Failures (GRAMA)
Released records cited on Campus Security Gaps and Pre-Shooting Warnings document administrative messaging problems:
| Alert | Issue |
|---|---|
| First alert (~19 min post-shooting) | Reportedly stated suspect in custody when he was not |
| Run-Hide-Fight alert (~88 min post-shooting) | Placeholder text: "Shooter in [INSERT location]" |
Researchers estimate ~10,000 students remained on campus during the false-custody window.
Security Posture Decisions
GRAMA compilations document pre-event administrative/security choices later questioned in reporting:
- ~6 campus police for a crowd later described as ~3,000
- UVU–Orem Joint Public Order Unit reportedly not activated despite UVU funding it for large events
- No ambulance staged on site
- No outside law-enforcement coordination despite Orem PD sending a ticket link September 3
- Faculty reportedly had no active-shooter training on record
For perimeter and rooftop gaps, see Campus Security Gaps, Losee Center, and Security Team.
Coordination gaps: Orem PD, FBI, and TPUSA
GRAMA summaries document documented gaps in how UVU administration aligned campus police, outside agencies, and the event host:
| Partner | Documented gap |
|---|---|
| Orem PD | Ticket link emailed Sept 3; Joint Public Order Unit (UVU-funded for large events) not activated |
| FBI | Tip line promoted post-shooting; no documented pre-event joint threat desk in released GRAMA |
| TPUSA | Outdoor amphitheater layout approved; hybrid security (campus + private detail) without full rooftop envelope |
Private close-protection disputes (e.g., Brian Harpole rooftop texts to Jeff Long) sit in Security Team and Law Enforcement at UVU. This page records institutional choices visible in GRAMA; it does not claim any Orem officer, FBI agent, or TPUSA staffer knew of the killing in advance.
Post-Event Administrative Messaging
Public Statements
UVU published a grief-and-condolences statement on uvu.edu — "Welcoming you back to campus with care" — emphasizing counseling and return-to-campus support.
@UVU later announced a Vigil for Unity (Sept 19, 2025, UCCU Center). Details are on UVU Social Media Response.
Records Transparency
UVU has acknowledged additional GRAMA documents exist beyond the initial 112-page DCNF release and has not released them. Names in September 9 warning chains remain redacted under state exemptions.
Physical Site Changes
Contractor Dan Merrell reports being told the courtyard pave-over was ordered for completion by Monday — see Pavers. UVU has not publicly released an after-action security report or TPUSA contract terms.
Open Administrative Questions
- Who decided not to activate the Joint Public Order Unit?
- What threat assessment, if any, preceded approval of the outdoor amphitheater layout?
- Who authored and approved the false custody and placeholder alerts?
- What additional GRAMA categories remain withheld, and on what basis?
Leadership Transition After the Event
According to project research notes citing @danksterintel-era commentary, UVU President Astrid S. Tuminez reportedly resigned in 2026 — the same year Washington County Sheriff Nate Brooksby, who handled the suspect's surrender, also resigned. Both are noted here only as documented leadership changes; no court finding ties either resignation to wrongdoing in the case.
- Status (Astrid S. Tuminez): Alive
- Post-shooting, UVU's president declined to give specifics, citing a pending external review (per AP); a UVU spokesperson declined detailed questions after the shooting.
GRAMA Records: Exact Documents and Redaction Basis
The pre-event chain released by the Daily Caller News Foundation (50 documents, 112 pages) maps to specific record numbers: UVU 25-330:0023, 0024, 0079, 0080. The 10:35 PM cabinet message (0023) reads in part: "two people showed up at their offices asking to talk to police about a plan ... If this is indeed true we do need to notify." The 11:19 PM reply states the visitors were "NOT from a senator's office. They are GOP reps who played like they knew more than they did!"
Every name in the September 9 communications is redacted under Utah Code 63G-2-305(11) — state exemptions for "security of public property" and "privacy." Researchers question why the identities remain withheld given the suspect's reported custody and the concluded event. See Pre-Shooting Warnings.
Laws (Charlie Kirk)
- UVU cabinet communications from September 9, emergency-alert approval chains, withheld GRAMA pages beyond the 112-page release, and after-action reports for September 10 are not public yet; the Charlie Kirk Investigation Laws could bring these powerful truths out.
Administration Messaging vs GRAMA Paper Trail
Citizen investigators contrast UVU public statements with GRAMA chat screenshots:
- Night-before "plan" visitors dismissed as GOP reps who "played like they knew more than they did," with names redacted.
- Undelivered "message to Charlie" in the police-chief communication chain.
- Post-shot alert errors (false custody; placeholder location text).
X accounts treat this as proof of institutional unfitness at minimum. Officials emphasize evolving crisis information. Readers should demand the remaining withheld pages UVU has acknowledged.
Interesting In This Area
- Cabinet emails on September 9 sit beside two separate outside warnings.
- The emergency alert reportedly failed while students were sheltering in place.
- Faculty had reportedly received no active-shooter training before that day.
- The chosen security posture is documented in the same records release.
Interesting In Other Areas
- Orem police and campus staff ran on separate radio and command chains.
- The GRAMA release itself is argued to have buried the warnings.
- Sept 9 foreknowledge is the strongest institutional thread investigators cite.
- The following event reportedly had no written security plan.
Images
Other Pages In This Section
Active-shooter training gaps, lockdown conditions and withheld internal communications — the faculty half of September 10, built only from records and public statements. Unverified faculty material is quarantined rather than repeated.
Read this
Losee Center (Alleged Sniper Rooftop)
The roof the government says the shot came from. Every part of it — line of sight, the lip, the drop, the screwdriver — has been measured by people who do not accept that account.
Read this
GRAMA records, undelivered warnings, emergency alerts and the university's handling of its own files — the institutional half of September 10. The same institution turns out to own the house north of campus.
Read thisElsewhere In The Investigation
This website's author is @HolonCitizen on X and YouTube/@HolonCitizen. Follow me there.
Interesting
- CNSSI-linked UVU profiles reportedly came down fourteen days after the killing.
- Researcher notes leave the gun house's ownership unresolved between the university and a contractor.
- Booking #460956 followed a 250-mile overnight drive, formalized near 4:00 AM.
Related Areas
- Pre-Shooting Warnings
- Campus Security Gaps
- UVU Social Media Response
- Law Enforcement at UVU
- Locations
- Security Team
- Pavers — Merrell's Account
- UVU Courtyard
Related
- September 10 Timeline
- UVU Campus Maps
- UVU overview