Planes, Drones, and “Real Killer” Operational Theories

Overview

This Level_3 page summarizes claims that aircraft and drones played a direct or supporting role in the operation that killed Charlie Kirk. These ideas go beyond the official rooftop rifle account and propose that platforms such as the U.S. Army‑linked HADES jet N1098L and multiple Egyptian military aircraft, as well as small unmanned aerial systems, may have been involved in surveillance, electronic interference, or even weapons delivery. All points here reflect public commentary and citizen‑research threads, not confirmed findings.

For technical and flight‑path details, see also Planes, N1098L, and Drones.

HADES N1098L and U.S. Army ISR jet (claims)

One of the most detailed aircraft theories centers on N1098L, a Bombardier Global 6500 business jet linked in public records to LASAI Aviation II LLC and described in defense reporting as part of the U.S. Army’s HADES (High Accuracy Detection & Exploitation System) program:

• Low‑altitude passes near UVU (claims):
  Investigative threads and videos (for example, posts by researchers referencing ADS‑B Exchange / Flightradar24 data and articles like The War Zone’s piece “Army Wants To Test Air‑Launched Drones From A Global Express Business Jet” at thewarzone.com) assert that N1098L flew at high altitude on September 10, 2025 but executed two unusually low passes near Utah Lake and the UVU area—one roughly three hours before the shooting and one around 20–25 minutes after. Reported numbers include altitudes dropping to around 200–600 feet AGL and speeds near 100–130 knots.
• Drone drop‑off and pickup hypothesis:
  X posts and long‑form videos (for example, material by @BlakeBednarz, @JG_CSTT, and others) argue these low, slow segments were consistent with air‑launched drone deployment and retrieval, suggesting small ISR or weaponized drones could have been dropped over water, loitered near campus, and then recovered after the incident. Screenshots of ADS‑B tracks are frequently presented as supporting visuals.
• Alleged NCTC conversation (claims):
  Some commentators recount a purported off‑the‑record conversation with a contact at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), claiming that internal analysts viewed the HADES maneuvers as suspicious and entertained the possibility of a rogue CIA‑linked faction using N1098L in the operation. These accounts are anecdotal and have not been corroborated by official documents.
• Crew and ownership speculation:
  The same research cites open‑source FAA and corporate records linking LASAI Aviation II LLC’s address to defense contracting work, and sometimes to high‑profile financiers, though those linkages are based on directory listings and corporate‑registration lookups rather than formal admissions.

Within the “real killer” discussion, some commentators use these HADES‑related claims to argue that U.S. military‑grade ISR assets may have been in position to support a sophisticated kill operation or subsequent cover‑up, rather than a purely local lone‑actor attack; no official investigation has publicly confirmed such a role.

Egyptian military jets near Provo (claims)

A second, related cluster of theories involves Egyptian Air Force aircraft with tail numbers such as SU‑BTT, SU‑BND, SU‑BTU, SU‑BTV, and SU‑BGM:

• Flight‑log compilations:
  Citizen researchers have compiled screenshots from flight‑tracking platforms (e.g., FlightRadar‑style services and aviation‑spotter forums) showing multiple Egyptian Gulfstream and Falcon jets flying to and from Provo (PVU) and other U.S. locations in 2025, including windows that bracket Charlie’s Utah appearance. Some of this material has been highlighted on X by accounts like @WeAre_TheElite and in video segments referenced by Candace Owens.
• SU‑BTT on and around September 10 (claims):
  Posts claim that SU‑BTT arrived in Provo around September 4, remained in the area through Charlie’s event, and departed on or shortly after September 10 toward Wilmington and then Cairo. Witness testimony relayed in these threads alleges the presence of 4–6 “U.S. Department of Defense Liaison”‑badged personnel with Egyptian passports, described as contractors or counter‑UAS specialists.
• Counter‑UAS/drone‑testing angle (claims):
  Sources citing unnamed airport and maintenance personnel at Duncan Aviation suggest that the Egyptian jets were involved in counter‑drone system testing in the Provo area between September 4–10. Some speculate this could mask or intertwine with offensive drone or electronic‑warfare capabilities relevant to the assassination.
• Special forces and training context:
  Commentary threads also point to Egypt’s El Sa’ka “Thunderbolt” special forces, based near Cairo, and long‑standing U.S.–Egypt military cooperation, arguing that elite units could have been aboard these flights. These points are inferential and built from military‑history sources rather than specific manifests for the Provo trips.

These Egyptian‑aircraft narratives are used to argue that foreign military assets with U.S. cooperation may have been in theater around the time of the killing, though no public manifest or official statement has confirmed any direct link to the event.

Small drones and possible weaponized UAV roles (claims)

Beyond crewed aircraft, numerous posts and videos discuss small drones in relation to the shot itself:

• Visible drones in event footage:
  Clips shared on X and YouTube (including posts credited to @Mr_LetGo45, @JG_CSTT, and others) show consumer‑style drones operating above the UVU event area before the shooting, despite earlier statements that no drones were allowed. A TPUSA “birthday tribute” video for Charlie, referenced by investigators, reportedly includes drone shots of the crowd and tents.
• High‑speed, hard‑to‑see drones (claims):
  Technical threads speculate about small, fast UAVs moving at roughly 100–150 mph, fast enough to be “somewhat unnoticeable” in a suburban soundscape but still capturable as brief streaks on 4K phone footage. Equations and examples are sometimes drawn from general drone‑aerodynamics discussions and U.S. Army ISR documentation.
• Weaponized micro‑UAV concept:
  Some analyses reference DARPA‑style platforms such as the X‑65 or loitering munitions akin to Switchblade drones, proposing a scenario in which a micro‑rifle or shaped‑charge payload could have been deployed from HADES, glided toward the campus following instrument‑approach paths, and fired from close range with minimal sound. These ideas are supported mainly by conceptual defense articles and speculative performance envelopes, not by publicly released footage of such a system at UVU.
• Butler, PA comparison:
  Threads also draw parallels to the Butler, Pennsylvania assassination attempt against Donald Trump, citing posts like those by @BlakeBednarz that claim to show unexplained drones near that event, suggesting a pattern of drone‑enabled hits with local patsies.

While imaginative, these UAV‑based killer theories currently rest on circumstantial video interpretation and open‑source military‑tech reporting, rather than concrete, independently verified proof of a weaponized drone at UVU on September 10.

How aircraft and drone theories fit into “real killer” questions

Within the broader Real Killer framework, aircraft and drone hypotheses serve to:

• Propose alternative delivery mechanisms (e.g., drone‑fired rounds, remotely operated weapons) that could account for disputed ballistics and acoustics.
• Suggest that the operation may have involved state‑level or contractor‑grade capabilities, rather than only a local individual with a bolt‑action rifle.
• Highlight information gaps—such as unreleased radar logs, military coordination records, and full‑resolution drone/aircraft footage—that would be crucial for confirming or rejecting these scenarios.

Readers should cross‑check these claims against more detailed technical material in Planes, N1098L, Drones, Videos, and Timeline, and maintain a clear distinction between documented flight data, inferred capabilities, and speculative operational narratives.